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MORRIS DUANE t

On May 12, 1933, the President approved the AgriculturalAdjustment

Act I and thereby the United States entered into a legal and economic experiment entirely novel in its history. It is very naturally my purpose to
emphasize the legal aspects of the new law and only to discuss its economic
and political consequences as they may form the background for and affect
the legal structure.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act begins, as does most of our recent
progressive legislation, with a "declaration of emergency" in the following
words:
"That the present acute economic emergency being in part the
consequence of a severe and increasing disparity between the prices
of agricultural and other commodities, which disparity has largely
destroyed the purchasing power of farmers for industrial products,
has broken down the orderly exchange of commodities, and has seriously impaired the agricultural assets supporting the national credit
structure, it is hereby declared that these conditions in the basic industry of agriculture have affected transactions in agricultural commodities with a national public interest, have burdened and obstructed
t A. B., Harvard, 1923; LL. B., Stetson, 1927; member of the Philadelphia Bar.
The author desires to acknowledge the great assistance he received from a memorandum
on the subject of the constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment Act prepared by his
partner, Claude C. Smith, Esq., of the Philadelphia Bar, and from C. Edward DePuy, LL. B.,
Columbia, 1933, in the preparation of annotations.
148 STAT. 31, U. S. C. A. (Special Pamphlet No. 4, July, 1933) 83. It is interesting historically to note that the National Industrial Recovery Act in § 8a, enacted after the passage
of the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act, provides that Title I of the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act may be referred to as the "Agricultural Adjustment Act" (H. R. REP. No. 5755,
73d Cong., Special Sess., Ser. No. 67) § 8a.
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the normal currents of commerce in such commodities, and render
imperative the immediate enactment of title I of this Act." 2
Following the declaration of emergency appears the declaration of
policy, as follows:
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress(i) To establish and maintain such balance between the production and consumption of agricultural commodities, and such marketing
conditions therefor, as will reestablish prices to farmers at a level that
will give agricultural commodities a purchasing power with respect to
articles that farmers buy, equivalent to the purchasing power of agricultural commodities in the base period. The base period in the case
of all agricultural commodities except tobacco shall be the prewar
period, August 1909-July 1914. In the case of tobacco, the base period
shall be the postwar period, August I919-July 1929.
(2) To approach such equality of purchasing power by gradual
correction of the present inequalities therein at as rapid a rate as is
deemed feasible in view of the current consumptive demand in domestic
and foreign markets.
(3) To protect the consumers' interest by readjusting farm production at such level as will not increase the percentage of the consumers' retail expenditures for agricultural commodities, or products
derived therefrom, which is returned to the farmer, above the percentage which was returned to the farmer in the prewar period, August
1909-July 1914." 8
As is now known to every one, the purposes mentioned in the above
quoted paragraphs are to be accomplished in part by inducing the producers
of basic agricultural commodities to curtail their production in return for
which the federal government is to pay them bonuses in cash or, in some
cases, in commodities. A great deal has been written with respect to this
feature of the Act and with respect to the processing taxes authorized by
the Act. Very little has been written with respect to that part of the Act
which authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to enter into marketing
agreements, and it is to that feature that I desire to address myself.
The Act reads as follows:
"In order to effecuate [sic] the declared policy, the Secretary of
Agriculture shall have power .
(2) To enter into marketing agreements with processors, associations of producers, and others engaged in the handling, in the current of interstate or foreign commerce of any agricultural commodity
or product thereof, after due notice and opportunity for hearing to
'Id. § i.
81d. §2.
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interested parties. The making of any such agreement shall not be
held to be in violation of any of the antitrust laws of the United
States, and any such agreement shall be deemed to be lawful: Provided,
That no such agreement shall remain in force after the termination of
this Act." This clause in the Act is of particular interest because, if it remains
in force, through it a legal system entirely new to the United States will
grow up. Through this medium, upon producers and distributors reaching
an agreement and upon the approval thereof by the Secretary of Agriculture, by reason of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, that agreement becomes in effect a law, and when licenses are issued thereunder it becomes
binding on all the persons in the territory affected by the agreement whether
or not they are voluntary parties thereto. In other words, instead of the
law being made by Congress the law in effect is made by the agreement of
a majority of the parties affected and by the approval of the executive
branch of the federal government.
It should also be noted that the above quoted clause of the Act renders
inoperative all of the federal antitrust laws and in effect permits monopolies
if approved by the Secretary of Agriculture.
It has been my privilege during the summer to draft or assist in drafting eight or nine marketing agreements under this clause of the Act, and I
felt that it would be of interest briefly to outline what those agreements
contained and to discuss some of the clauses in them which have met with
the approval of the government in those agreements which are now in force.
A marketing agreement is very much like any other contract. The
contracting parties have been, so far, associations of producers of agricultural commodities and distributors of those commodities, together with
any individual producers who desire to join. The names of the parties are
followed by the definitions of the various words as used in the agreement,
including a list of the various associations affected and a statement of the
area in which the agreement is to be effective.
The agreement then covers the following important subjects:
i. The fixing of wholesale and retail prices.
2. A list of rules governing fair trade practice.
3. A method of administration of the agreement.
4. Usually a somewhat elaborate system by which it is hoped
production will be controlled.
Retail Price Fixing
The Department of Agriculture has, to date, approved a number of
agreements governing milk and its products. Each of these agreements
IId. § 8 (2).
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has fixed the minimum price at which milk should be purchased from producers and has fixed the price at which milk should be sold at both wholesale
and retail to consumers. It should be noted that this fixing of prices has
gone much further under the AgriculturalAdjustment Act than it has under
the National Industrial Recovery Act.

The National Recovery Adminis-

exception, 5

tration, with one
has refused to fix prices definitely, but it has
approved in almost every code a clause to the effect that there shall be no
selling at less than cost of production. The clause then continues to define
the method by which cost of production shall be determined.
Fair Practice Rules
Next in importance to the fixing of prices, in which of course the
producer is primarily interested, are the fair practice rules, sometimes called
rules of fair competition. In order to illustrate what is now becoming the
law in some areas under the Agricultural Adjustment Act I should like to
quote a few of these rules.
"Samples-i-. It shall be considered unfair practice to put out
goods as samples."

6

"Special Inducements-4. It shall be considered unfair practice
to give or pay to any hotel, apartment, or factory owners, managers,
janitors, receiving clerks, maids, housekeepers, linen-room attendants,
or any other persons, money, compensation, gratuity, free milk, cream,
or the derivatives of milk, or discounts for either business or information or assistance in procuring business, and any employee violating the
provisions of this paragraph shall be discharged." 7
"Premiums-Discounts-7.It shall be considered unfair practice
to pay premiums or allow discounts of any sort to new customers." 8
"Advertising-Io. Except as the same may be conducted through
an association of contracting distributors, it shall be considered unfair
practice:
(a) To take advertising in any program, periodical, or publication of any kind whatsoever unless such publication has a general paid
circulation or is for sale on news stands. Advertisements or display
type in telephone directories, advertisements in hotel registers, and
radio advertising are to be considered in the same class as program
advertisements.
(b) To conduct exhibits and displays, such as floats, wagons,
automobiles, and similar displays in parades and like activities.
Code of Fair Competition in the Petroleum Industry. Approved Aug. i9, 1933. Art. V,
Rule 4, Vol. IIA, Federal Trade Regulation Service, Commerce Clearing House, Inc.,

ff 85io.oi, p. 8o66.

I Marketing Agreement for Milk-Chicago Milk Shed.
81ol.oi, Exhibit D, § I,p. 7005.
1Id. Exhibit D, § 4.
8
Id. Exhibit D, § 7.

Approved July 28, 1933. Id. at
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(c) To buy tickets for benefits, concerts, fairs, and exhibits." 9
"Giving Goods Away-i i. It shall be considered unfair practice
to give away goods." 10
The above provisions have actually been approved by the Secretary
of Agriculture and licenses have been issued thereunder, so that it is now
illegal in the areas affected by the agreements for any person, whether or
not he has signed the agreement, to do any of the things prohibited. The
following are some of the unfair trade practices prohibited in some of the
agreements which have been presented and on which hearings have been
held, but which have not yet been approved by the Secretary of Agriculture:
"The defamation of competitors by falsely imputing to them dishonorable conduct, inability to perform contracts, questionable credit
standing, or by other false representation, or the false disparagement
of the grade or quality of their goods, with the tendency and capacity
to mislead or deceive purchasers or prospective purchasers." 11
"Wilfully enticing away the employees of competitors with the
purpose and effect of unduly hampering, injuring, or embarrassing
competitors in their businesses." 12
"The practice of shipping or delivering products which do not
conform to the samples submitted or representation made prior to
securing the orders, without the consent of the purchasers to such
substitutions, and with the effect of deceiving or misleading pur-

chasers."

13

"The making or causing or permitting to be made or published
any false, untrue, or deceptive statement by way of advertisement or
otherwise concerning the grade, quality, quantity, substance, character,
nature, origin, size or preparation of any product of the industry,
having the tendency and capacity to mislead or deceive purchasers or
prospective purchasers." 14
"Securing information from competitors concerning their businesses by false or misleading statements or representations or by false
impersonations of one in authority and the wrongful use thereof to
unduly hinder or stifle the competition of such competitors." 15
It can readily be seen that the purpose of these rules is to carry ,out
President Roosevelt's idea that in the case where 9o% of an industry are
willing to abide by rules of fair competition the remaining io% who by
their unfair methods of competition have affected that industry, should be
forced to comply with the rules by which the majority are willing to be
governed. Whether or not they will accomplish that purpose remains to
92 Id. Exhibit D, § io.
0Id. Exhibit D, § ii.
"National Marketing Agreement for Frozen Desserts. (Rules of Fair Trade Practice).
SIbid.

Ibid.
Sbid.
'5Ibid.
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be seen, but the result will be, at least for the time being, to discourage individual enterprise and initiative in the interests of a stabilized and cooperative
industry.
Methods of Administration
Another vital part of these agreements are those clauses which provide
for their administration. There has been a great deal of discussion in
Washington as to whether the various industries should be self administered, subject to final appeal to the United States government, or whether
the government in the first instance should be the sole administrator. It
seems obvious that the government, even with the great number of employees employed under the Recovery Act and in the Department of Agriculture, does not have sufficient man power to govern in detail each of the
industries in the country, and these agreements therefore have uniformly
provided for a system of administration controlled in the first instance by
the industry affected.
In the national agreement for the butter industry, which has not as
yet been signed but which has been submitted to the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and which is typical, a National Butter Board is set
up consisting of ten members, five to be chosen by the leading association
of butter manufacturers and five to be chosen by the leading producers' cooperative association. The agreement provides that the duties of the Board
shall include the following:
i. The promulgation of rules, regulations, practices and policies
to carry out the agreement and the purposes of the Act.
2. The study of butter exchanges and similar organizations and
the making of suggestions for their reorganization.
3. The making of recommendations to the Secretary for the
stabilization of butter prices.
4. The collecting of information and data on production and consumption of butter.
5. The appointment of various sub-committees.
6. The cooperation with duly constituted representatives of other
branches of the dairy industry.
7. The investigating of violations of the agreement; the holding
of hearings thereon; the making of findings of fact and reports.
8. The reporting of such violations to the Secretary of Agriculture and the making of recommendations with respect to penalties to
be meted out to violators.
The thought behind the creation of each of these boards is not only
to enforce the provisions of the agreement and to carry out the policies of
the AgriculturalAdjustment Act, but includes cooperation with all branches
of industry to the end that the producers may receive the highest possible
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price for their product and that the consumers may receive the best possible
product at a fair price, which will include a fair profit to the manufacturers.
Production Control
One of the main purposes of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as can
be seen from the declaration of policy which was quoted in the first part
of this article, is to control production to the end that supply and demand
will be reasonably in line and thereby to insure the producer a greater return
for his labor. To that end most of the agreements which have been
so far approved provide for various systems of production control. These
systems vary in accordance with the product which is being considered, and
in the case of dairy products often include the much discussed basic and
surplus allotment plan.
General Provisions
The agreements.generally contain a provision requiring uniform systems of accounting to be kept by the contracting parties and requiring that
the books and records of the contracting parties be opened during the usual
hours of business to the Secretary of Agriculture or his duly authorized
agent, and they permit the Secretary of Agriculture to make summaries of
the information thus obtained and to publish such summaries for the general information of the public and of the industry. The Secretary of Agriculture is generally required to hold the information confidential as to its
details unless he is subpoenaed by a court or a governmental agency which
has that power.
The agreements and the Act of course are based upon the government's
authority over interstate commerce and the agreements usually contain recitals to show that the business which it is sought to regulate is wholly an
interstate business or is so inextricably intermingled with interstate business
as to permit regulation by the federal government.
. Termination
All of the agreements of course contain provisions as to termination
and provide that 75% of the contracting producers or contracting distributors may terminate the agreement on thirty days' notice. They also
provide that the agreements may be terminated by the Secretary of Agriculture at any time upon twenty-four hours' notice by a press release, and
that the agreement terminates automatically "whenever the provisions of
the Act authorizing the agreement shall cease to be in effect".
The Act itself provides as follows with respect to Title I thereof:
"This title shall cease to be in effect whenever the President finds
and proclaims that the national economic emergency in relation to
agriculture has been ended; and pending such time the President shall
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by proclamation terminate with respect to any basic agricultural commodity such provisions of this title as he finds are not requisite to
carrying out the declared policy with respect to such commodity. The
Secretary of Agriculture shall make such investigations and reports
thereon to the President as may be necessary to aid him in executing
this section." 16
If the Act were to be declared unconstitutional the agreements would
automatically terminate and the fact that some persons had voluntarily
entered into them would not affect that result because all agreements so far
signed have been made specifically dependent on the Act.
Enforcement
It can readily be seen that these agreements, in order to be effective,
must be provided with teeth, and the Act provides those teeth in the following words:
"Sec. 8. In order to effecuate [sic] the declared policy, the Secretary of Agriculture shall have power .
"(3) To issue licenses permitting processors, associations of producers, and others to engage in the handling, in the current of interstate or foreign commerce, of any agricultural commodity or product
thereof, or any competing commodity or product thereof. Such
licenses shall be subject to such terms and conditions, not in conflict
with existing Acts of Congress or regulations pursuant thereto, as
may be necessary to eliminate unfair practices or charges that prevent
or tend to prevent the effectuation of the declared policy and the
restoration of normal economic conditions in the marketing of such
commodities or products and the financing thereof. The Secretary of
Agriculture may suspend or revoke any such license, after due notice
and opportunity for hearing, for violations of the terms or conditions
thereof. Any order of the Secretary suspending or revoking any such
license shall be final if in accordance with law. Any such person engaged in such handling without a license as required by the Secretary
under this section shall be subject to a fine of not more than $i,ooo for
each day during which the violation continues."
Up to the present time the Secretary of Agriculture has licensed distributors after the signing of an agreement by those doing the major volume
of business in the area affected. No attempt has been made to issue individual licenses to each person in business in the territory. Instead, a blanket
license has been issued, the original of which has been signed by the Secretary and is on file at Washington. The persons licensed have in each
case been the distributors of farm products and no attempt has been made
to license the producers. It is provided in the regulations of the Secretary
of Agriculture, approved by the President, that any distributor by the payment of $2 may obtain a certificate evidencing the fact that the holder
'Agricultural Adjustment Act, supra note I, § 13.
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thereof is a licensee,17 but such certificate is not necessary to constitute a
distributor a licensee. He becomes such by the mere act of the Secretary
in issuing a license to all persons in the business in the territory affected.
The license itself usually follows very closely the wording of the
marketing agreement. It begins with a list of the definitions of the words
used in the license, which usually follow those definitions as used in the
marketing agreement. It then, in general, follows the terms of the marketing agreement and incorporates the price schedules, the rules for production
control and the fair practice rules, together with the requirements for the
keeping of accounts. Both the marketing agreements and the licenses usually
have elaborate introductory clauses in which it is set out in full how necessary it is that the agreement or the licenses, as the case may be, should be
made effective, and describing the investigation which has been made into
the situation and the fact that the matter is one for the federal government
by reason of its interstate commerce features.
When one comes to think of it, it is an amazing legal proposition that
by merely issuing such a license under the terms of a marketing agreement
an officer of the executive branch of the federal government thereby enacts
a law which, if violated, subjects the violator, with or without his consent,
to the revocation of his license and thereafter to a penalty of a $iooo a day
fine for operating without a license. This result of the Agricultural Adjustinent Act and the marketing agreements which have been entered into thereunder must bring to the mind of every lawyer the question as to whether
or not such an act is constitutional and the further question as to whether
or not it is constitutional for the federal government to fix wholesale and
retail prices of articles in intrastate commerce.
Constitutionality
Several articles have been written with respect to the constitutionality
of the act prohibiting gold payments and of the National Recovery Act.'8
A large part of what has been said in these discussions is applicable to the
Agricultural Adjustment Act.
In the recent cases, Beck v. Wallace and Economy Dairy Company v.
Wfallace,- 9 decided by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, the
constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment Act was upheld, and with
1' Milk Regulation, Series I, § 3oo, Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Approved
by the President July 22, 1933.
'Post and Willard, The Power of Congress to Nullify Gold Clauses (1933) 46 HAv.
L. REv. 1225; Hanna, FederalCurrency Restrictions and Gold Contracts (1933) 9 A. B. A. J.
349; Boudin, Is Econondc Planning Constitutional? (1933) 21 GEo. L. 3. 253, 387; Handler,

National IndustrialRecovery Act (1933) 9 A. B. A. J. 440, at 444; Beck, The National Recovery Act in the Supreme Court (Nov. 1933) FORTUNE 48; Hervey, Some Constitutional
Aspects of the National IndustrialRecovery Act (1933) 8 TE.LE L. Q. 3; Note (1933) 47
HARV. L. REv. 85.

U. S. Law Week, Sept. 5, 1933, at 9. See also Southport Petroleum Co. v. Ickes
41 WAsH. L. REP. 577, in which the Oil Code under the National Industrial Recovery
Act was upheld as constitutional.
(1933)
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it the provisions of the Chicago Milk Marketing Agreement, which among
other things fixed prices to be paid to producers in the Chicago Milk Shed
and fixed the prices at which milk and its products should be sold both at
wholesale and retail in the Chicago metropolitan area.20 Counsel for the
complainants in that case based their contention for the unconstitutionality
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act upon the following propositions:
i. That the Act is not within the powers delegated to the Congress
under the commerce clause.
2. That the Act violates the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
3. That the Act unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to
the Secretary of Agriculture.
4. That the Act violates the rights of the states as protected by
the Tenth Amendment.
Rather than take the first two arguments separately, I believe it advisable to consider them together. It has long been the law and it was
settled beyond doubt in the Legal Tender Cases,21 that in the exercise of an
"express power" or of a "power necessary and proper for carrying an
express power" into execution, often called an "implied power", Congress
may legislate in the public interest as it wills, provided the means employed
bear a fair and reasonable relation to the lawful object. The Fifth Amendment prohibits the unreasonable and arbitrary deprivation of property, but
where the legislation is in the public interest and is designed to carry out
such powers the prohibition gives way and the law has conformed with the
requirements of "due process".
In the present case the power of Congress to provide for such marketing agreements and for the fixing of prices under them rests squarely on
the commerce clause of the Constitution. It is so with the greater part
of the present administration's legislation.
The Commerce Power
We therefore must decide whether this Act is a proper exercise of the
federal government's right to "regulate interstate commerce". (For the
moment I defer discussing the processing tax feature of the Act, which of
course depends also on the taxing power.)
It must be noted immediately that the Act contemplates, and the marketing agreements have provided, that agricultural products may be controlled from the place of their production through transportation all the
way to their final resting place in the hands of the retail consumer.
21 Supra note 6, Exhibits A and C.
2 Knox v. Lee; Parker v. Davis, 12 Wall. 457 (U.
man, 1,o U. S. 421, 4 Sup. Ct. i (884).

S. 187o). See also Juilliard v. Green-
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In the case of milk, methods of production control and fixed prices to
be paid to the farmer are at one end and fixed prices to be paid by the retail
consumer are at the other. The area in between is well covered by fair
practice rules, methods of administration and wholesale prices.
A mere statement of these facts shows that to uphold the constitutionality of this feature of the law, the commerce clause must be liberally construed and further, that the case of Hammer v. Dagenhart22 and many
other cases cited therein supporting the doctrine of states' rights both before
commerce has begun and after commerce has ceased, must be reversed or
distinguished.
It is my opinion that what the Supreme Court does to that case will be
determinative of the constitutionality of most of the emergency legislation.
Will the Court follow, overrule or distinguish? I do not pretend to be able
to predict what will be done, but in my opinion the case, at least on its facts,
can be technically distinguished.
Let us examine the case. The facts were these: Congress passed an
act which prohibited the transportation in interstate commerce of goods
made at a factory in which, within thirty days prior to their removal therefrom, children under the ag6 of fourteen years had been employed or permitted to work, or children between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years
had been employed or permitted to work more than eight hours in any day
or more than six days in any week, or after the hour of 7 P. M. or before
the hour of 6 A. M. This statute was held unconstitutional by a five to
four decision. Which of its facts are important for our purpose? First,
it should be noted that there is no regulation of commerce at all. At
the time the statute applies there has been no commerce. The act prohibits the receipt for shipment of the article. Second, there is no regulation
of the destination. Third, there is involved no traffic, 2 3 no transportation 24
and no intercourse. 25 There was merely involved the manufacture of a
product.
In the course of the opinion, after discussing the previous cases where
the regulatory power of Congress had been upheld, the Court, through Mr.
Justice Day, said:
"In each of these instances the use of interstate transportation
was necessary to the accomplishment of harmful results. In other
words, although the power over interstate transportation was to regu=247 U. S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529 (I9,8).

"Commerce" is recognized and interpreted to mean "traffic" in Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U1. S.375, 25 Sup. Ct. 276 (9o5) (Stock Yards Act) ; Stafford v. Wallace, 258
U. S.495, 42 Sup. Ct. 397 (1922) (Packers & Stockyards Act) ; Board of Trade v. Olsen,
262 U. S. I, 43 Sup. Ct. 470 (1922) (Grain Futures Act).
' "Commerce" is recognized and interpreted to mean "transportation" in Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. i (U. S.1824).
21"Commerce" was said to be "intercourse" by Marshall, C. J., ibid.
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late, that could only be accomplished by prohibiting the use of the
facilities of interstate commerce to effect the evil intended.
"This element is wanting in the present case .

.

. The act in its

effect does not regulate transportation among the states, but aims to
standardize the ages at which children may be employed in mining and
manufacturing within the states .

.

., and the mere fact that they

were intended for interstate commerce transportation does not make
their production subject to federal control under the commerce
power." 26
These facts are obviously very different from the present case. In a
marketing agreement the production, transportation and dissemination and
sale of the product are involved. Here you have traffic, transportation and
intercourse, and where the movement is between states you have interstate
traffic, transportation and intercourse. That has been held to be interstate
commerce. This is sufficient, I believe, to allow us to distinguish the facts.
However, it is a great deal easier to distinguish the facts than it is to distinguish the other grounds for the decision as expressed by the Court.
To quote further:
"It is further contended that the authority of Congress may be
exerted to control interstate commerce in the shipment of child-made
goods because of the effect of the circulation of such goods in other
States where the evil of this class of labor has been recognized by local
legislation, and the right to thus employ child labor has been more
rigorously restrained than in the State of production. In other words,
that the unfair competition, thus engendered, may be controlled by
closing the channels of interstate commerce to manufacturers in those
States where the local laws do not meet what Congress deems to be the
more just standard of other States.
"There is no power vested in Congress to require the States to
exercise their police power so as to prevent possible unfair competition.
Many causes may cooperate to give one State, by reason of local laws
or conditions, an economic advantage over others. The Commerce
Clause was not intended to give to Congress a general authority to
equalize such conditions .
"The grant of power to Congress over the subject of interstate
commerce was to enable it to regulate such commerce, and not to give
it authority to control the States in their exercise of the police power
over local trade and manufacture.
"The grant of authority over a purely federal matter was not
intended to destroy the local power always existing and carefully reserved to the States in the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution." 27
As a final word the Court clearly stated what it conceived to be its duty
and what would be the result of violating that duty by upholding the legislation in controversy.
= Hammer v. Dagenbart, supra note 22, at 271, 38 SUp. Ct. at 531.
Id. at 273, 38 Sup. Ct. at 531.
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"We have neither authority nor disposition to question the motives
of Congress in enacting this legislation. The purposes intended must
be attained consistently with constitutional limitations and not by an
invasion of the powers of the states. This court has no more important function than that which devolves upon it the obligation to
preserve inviolate the constitutional limitations upon the exercise of
authority, federal and state, to the end that each may continue to discharge, harmoniously with the other, the duties entrusted to it by the
Constitution

.

.

.

The far reaching result of upholding the act can-

not be more plainly indicated than by pointing out that if Congress
can thus regulate matters entrusted to local authority by prohibition
of the movement of commodities in interstate commerce, all freedom
of commerce will be at an end, and the power of the states over local
matters may be eliminated, and thus our system of government be
practically destroyed." 28
It is the broad constitutional doctrine of states' rights and its apparent
infringement by the emergency legislation which has given most constitutional authorities the greatest concern. They argue that the affirmance of
this legislation will virtually destroy the rights of the states to exercise any
control over business whatsoever, and will nullify the Tenth Amendment
entirely. They point out that this doctrine is the foundation stone of the
Constitution and was supported by James Madison, Chief Justice White,
and many other figures in constitutional history.
On the other hand, Edward S. Corwin, Professor of Jurisprudence at
Princeton University, in a recently published article,2 9 discusses this phase
of the matter at some length and concludes that "Madison's and White's
views are outmoded by times and conditions which vindicate Marshall's
prophetic vision". 30 Professor Corwin believes that the doctrine of dual
sovereignty as set forth in Hammer v.Dagenhart31 will not be sustained
32
by the Court in considering future legislation under the commerce clause.
Id. at 276, 38 Sup. Ct. at 532.
' Corwin, Congress' Power to Prohibit Commerce-A Crucial Constitutional Issue
(1933) 18 CORN. L. Q. 477.
1 Id. at 504.
'Sutpra note 22.
"' "Hammer v. Dagenhart represents high tide in the more recent surges of Madisonian
doctrine. What is the standing of this decision now, fifteen years later? [Professor Corwin
here discusses United States v. Hill, infrl note 46; and Brooks v. United States, infra note.
47].
"Hammer v. Dagenhart is today elbowed into rather narrow quarters.
Moreover, it
may happen with a legal, as with a military position, which does not yield readily to assault,
that it may be turned. Indeed, it has occurred more than once in recent years that the Court
by a radical shift of position with reference to a vexed constitutional problem, has thrown
the latter into an entirely new perspective, and with striking results in constitutional interpretation. Why should not something of the same nature take place in the present instance?
The truth is that it has, although the transfer of position alluded to is not yet complete ...
"Interstate commerce, or rather interstate business, thus takes on the territorial aspect of
a field over which national power must hold sway if its activities are not to take place beyond
the reach of a supervisory political judgment. Its articulated structure could indeed be restored to effective local control only to destroy it. As to it state power is actually non-exist-
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He further believes that there is ample authority for holding that the commerce clause covers the legislation of the recent administration. With that
thought in mind let us consider the physically intrastate commerce which it
is also proposed to regulate. Suppose a farmer produces wheat in Pennsylvania and transports it and sells it in Pennsylvania. Can the federal
government fix prices to be paid to such a farmer?
The cases bearing on this point have a very direct and startling application not only to it but also to the interstate traffic described above.
In the case of Southern Railway Co. v. United States,33 the Supreme
Court held that in a given case when appropriate findings of fact are made
to the effect that interstate and intrastate commerce are intermingled, Congress may properly pass an act controlling both. The act considered in
that case provided that safety appliances should be carried on all trains
operated by railroads "engaged in interstate commerce". This was held to
apply not only to those trains actually engaged in interstate commerce, but
also to trains operated by such railroads between points in the same state.
The reasoning back of this opinion is that Congress has the power to "foster,
protect, control and restrain" where interstate or foreign commerce is concerned, and that where interstate and intrastate commerce were interde34
pendent, Congress, under the commerce clause, could control both.
ent--an empty fiction. It is to be governed at all, it must be by the National Government.
*
. . The determinative question is this: Does the Interstate Market serve to capitalize
conditions which may reasonably be thought to be destructive of the national prosperity if
persisted in, or does it afford the means of deriving private advantage from socially undesirable conditions? If so, Congress is entitled to take corrective action.
"And the vital defect of Hammer v. Dagenhart against this background is seen at once
to have been its sheer anachronism." Corwin, supra note 29, at 499-503.
3222 U. S. 20, 32 Sup. Ct. 2 (IgII).

"That this was the motivating influence for the Court's opinion is shown by the following language:
"We come then to the question whether these acts are within the power of Congress
under the commerce clause of the Constitution, considering that they are not confined to
vehicles used in moving interstate traffic, but embrace vehicles used in moving intrastate
traffic. The answer to this question, depends upon another, which is, Is there a real or
substantial relation or connection between what is required by these acts in respect of
vehicles used in moving intrastate traffic and the object which the acts are obviously designed to attain, namely, the safety of interstate commerce and of those who are employed in its movement? Or, stating it in another way, Is there such a close or direct
relation or connection between the two classes of traffic, whin moving over the same
railroad as to make it certain that the safety of the interstate traffic and of those who
are employed in its movement will be promoted in a real or substantial sense by applying
the requirements of these acts to vehicles used in moving the traffic which is intrastate as
well as to those used in moving that which is interstate? . . .
"Speaking only of railroads which are highways of both interstate and intrastate
commerce, these things are of common knowledge: Both classes of traffic are at times
carried in the same car and when this is not the case the cars in which they are carried
are frequently commingled in the same train and in the switching and other movements
at terminals. Cars are seldom set apart for exclusive use in moving either class of traffic,
but generally are used interchangeably in moving both; and the situation is much the
same with trainmen, switchmen and like employees, for they usually, if not necessarily,
have to do with both classes of traffic. Besides, the several trains on the same railroad
are not independent in point of movement and safety, but are interdependent, for whatever brings delay or disaster to one, or results in disabling one of its operatives, is calculated to impede the progress and imperil the safety of other trains. And so the absence
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The question to be decided in a given case, as the Supreme Court has
stated in Florida v. United States,35 is as to the "propriety of the exertion"
of the power, 30 and this is mainly a question of fact. These questions of
fact have been the subject of investigation and consideration by the Secretary of Agriculture, and before approving marketing agreements and in
pursuance of the powers vested in him by the Act, pertinent findings have
been made by him.
It is impossible to discuss all of the cases where the Supreme Court
has sustained Congressional legislation of broad interstate and in some cases
intrastate control under the commerce clause, but in recent years the Court
has affirmed the constitutionality of the following laws:
The Wilson Act of 189o, subjecting intoxicants upon their "arrival" in
a state to the laws thereof; 37 the Anti-Lottery Act of 1895,38 dosing the
channels of interstate transportation to lottery tickets, an earlier act having
already banned lottery tickets from the mails; 39 an act passed in 19oo
excluding from interstate transportation game slaughtered in violation of
state laws ; 40 the Pure Food and Drug Act of 19o6, barring from interstate
transportation foods and drugs not inspected and labelled in accordance
with the Act; 41 the commodity clause of the Hepburn Act of the same
year, forbidding interstate carriers to transport in interstate commerce commodities in which they have any interest "direct or indirect"; 42 the Mann
Act of I9io, forbidding the transporting of women from one state to
another for immoral purposes ; 43 the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913, prohibitof appropriate safety appliance from any part of any train is a menace not only to that
train but to others.
"These practical considerations make it plain, as we think, that the questions before
stated must be answered in the affirmative.' Id. at 26, 27, 32 Sup. Ct. at 4.
282 U. S. 194, 51 Sup. Ct. 119 (1931).
v "The question in the present cases, then, is not one of authority, but its appropriate exercise. The propriety of the exertion of the authority must be tested by its relation to the
purpose of the grant and with suitable regard to the principle that, whenever the federal
power is exerted within what would otherwise be the domain of state power, the justification
of the exercise of the federal power must clearly appear." Id. at 211, 51 Sup. Ct. at 124.
ST26 STAT. 313 (1890). Held constitutional in In re Kahner, 140 U. S.545, 1i Sup. Ct.

865 (i8gi).

828 STAT. 963 (1895), 18 U. S.C. A. § 387 (1926).
France v.United States, 164 U. S.
676, 17 Sup. Ct. 219 (1897) ; Champion v.Ames, 188 U. S.321, 23 Sup. Ct. 321 (1903).
STAT. 465 (1890), 18 U. S. C.A. § 336 (1926).
Ex Parte Rapier, 143 U. S. I1o,
12 Sup. Ct. 374 (892).
403I STAT. 188 (goo), amended 35 STAT. 1137 (1909), 18 U. S. C. A. §392 (1926).
This Act has not been passed on directly by the Supreme Court. But see Silz v.Hesterberg,
211 U. S.31, 29 Sup. Ct. 1o (1908). Cf. Geer v.Connecticut, 161 U. S.519, 16 Sup.Ct. 6oo
C26

(1896).

a34 STAr. 768 (1906), 21 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-3 (1926). Hipolite Egg Co. v. United
States, 220 U. S.45, 31 Sup. Ct. 364 (1911).
"34 STAT. 584 (1906), 49 U. S. C.A. § I (8)(1926). Great Northern Ry. v.United
States, 208 U. S.452, 28 Sup. Ct. 313 (9o8). Cf. Bitterman v.Louisville & Nashville Ry.,
207 U. S. 205, 28 Sup. Ct. 91 (907).
036 STAT. 825 (igio), iS U. S. C. A. §§ 397-404 (i926).
Hoke v.United States, 227
U. S.308, 33 Sup. Ct. 281 (1913). See also, Caminetti v.United, States, 242 U. S.470, 37
Sup. Ct. 192 (1917).
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ing the shipment of intoxicants into a state, there to be used in violation
of its laws; 44 the Federal Quarantine Act of 1917, forbidding the shipment from infected areas of diseased plants and shrubs; 45 the Read BoneDry Amendment of 1917, forbidding the transportation of intoxicants into
any state which forbids the manufacture thereof; 46 the Federal Motor
Vehicle Act of 1919, prohibiting the transportation of stolen motor vehicles
from one state to another and the receiving, concealment, or sale of the
same.

47

Some of these cases are based on the theory that the product itself is
harmful, but that certainly cannot be said of all, as for instance the Federal
Motor Vehicle Act. Some students believe most of them can be justified
under the so-called federal "police power"; others deny that such a power
exists.
No discussion of the right of Congress to control intrastate commerce
would be complete without at least a reference to the theory which is now
being advocated in Washington. Many of the lawyers attached to the
administration are taking the position that it is not only in the physical sense
that interstate commerce can be regulated by the federal government. They
say that the physical conception of interstate commerce is not sufficient, but
that in addition whether or not the federal government has control should
depend upon an economic conception. This conception is that an article or
a transaction is in interstate commerce if it economically depends on or
competes with other articles which are physically in interstate commerce.
For instance: where the prices of an article are dependent upon world competition, there is an element of interstate commerce on the theory that the
marketing and sale of the product, although in a particular case entirely
intrastate, is so bound up with such competition and with conditions involving similar products transported in interstate commerce that the commerce power extends to the physically intrastate transaction. I will leave
a further and more detailed discussion of this theory for some other writer.
However, in this connection, it is interesting to note that the federal government has asked the states to cooperate in the emergency legislation, notably
in the N. I. R. A., by enacting similar legislation governing intrastate
transactions.
Having discussed the power of Congress under the commerce clause,
it is now necessary to direct attention to the question whether, even if it
4'37 STAT. 699 (1913). Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U. S. 311, 37
Sup. Ct. 18o (I97).
4539 STAT. 1165 (1917), 7 U. S. C. A. § 161 (1926).
Oregon-Washington R. R. & Nay.
Co. v. State of Washington, 27o U. S. 87, 46 Sup. Ct. 279 (1926).
4639 STAT. io69 (917), 18 U. S. C. A. §341 (1926). United States v. Hill, 248 U. S.
420, 39 Sup. Ct. 143 (1919).
4741 STAT. 324 (igig), 18 U. S. C. A. §408 (1926).
Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S.
432, 45 Sup. Ct. 345 (1925).
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does exist, the means employed by Congress bear a fair and reasonable
relation to the object in view.
Due Process
It must be admitted as a matter of constitutional law that Congress
does not have emergency powers as such. However, in interpreting the
due process clause, the Supreme Court has allowed Congress to go far
afield in obtaining the means to effect the lawful object in cases where an
emergency existed and especially where the legislation was temporary in
character.
It is believed by some that in times of emergency the implied powers
automatically increase through more liberal construction. The following
cases are illustrative of this emergency idea:
In the case of Wilson v. New, 45 the Supreme Court sustained the
Adamson Act fixing the hours and wages of railway employees, passed to
meet the situation created by the threatened strike in 1916. In Block v.
Hirsh,49 the Supreme Court sustained the validity of housing laws requiring
a landlord to permit a tenant to continue in possession under an expired
lease on the same terms and conditions set forth in the lease unless those
terms and conditions were changed by a board which was created for that
purpose. These cases sustain the elastic character of the due process clause
in its application to changing conditions. It may also be argued that the
same elasticity can be applied to the commerce clause.
In order to obtain the full force of those decisions it is necessary to
quote briefly from them:
In Wilson v. New et al.,49a the Court, speaking through Mr. Chief

Justice White, said:
"That the business of common carriers by rail is in a sense a
public business because of the interest of society in the continued operation and rightful conduct of such business and that the public interest
begets a public right of regulation to the full extent necessary to secure
and protect it, is settled by so many decisions, state and federal, and
is illustrated by such a continuous exertion of state and federal legislative power as to leave no room for question on the subject. It is
also equally true that as the right to fix by agreement between the
carrier and its employees a standard of wages to control their relations
is primarily private, the establishment and giving effect to such agreed
on standard is not subject to be controlled or prevented by public authority. But taking all these propositions as undoubted, if the situation
which we have described and with which the act of Congress dealt be
U. S. 332,37 Sup. Ct. 298 (1917).
"1256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (i92I);
Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256
U. S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. 465 (1921); Levy Leasing Co., Inc., v. Siegel, 258 U. S.242, 42 Sup.
"243

Ct. 289 (1922).
"Supra note 48, at 347, 37 Sup. Ct. at 301.
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taken into view, that is, the dispute between the employers and employees as to a standard of wages, their failure to agree, the resulting
absence of such standard, the entire interruption of interstate commerce which was threatened, and the infinite injury to the public interest which was imminent, it would seem inevitably to result that the
power to regulate necessarily obtained and was subject to be applied
to the extent necessary to provide a remedy for the situation, which
included the power to deal with the dispute, to provide by appropriate
action for a standard of wages to fill the want of one caused by the
failure to exert the private right on the subject and to give effect by
appropriate legislation to the regulations thus adopted. This must be
unless it can be said that the right to so regulate as to save and protect
the public interest did not apply to a case where the destruction of the
public right was imminent as the result of a dispute between the parties
and their consequent failure to establish by private agreement the
standard of wages which was essential; in other words, that the existence of the public right and the public power to preserve it was wholly
under the control of the private right to establish a standard by agreement. Nor is it an answer to this view to suggest that the situation
was one of emergency and that emergency cannot be made the source
of power. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2. The proposition begs the
question, since although an emergency may not call into life a power
which has never lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a reason
for the exertion of a living power already enjoyed. If acts which, if
done, would interrupt, if not destroy, interstate commerce may be by
anticipation legislatively prevented, by the same token the power to
regulate may be exercised to guard against the cessation of interstate
commerce threatened by a failure of employers and employees to agree
as to the standard of wages, such standard being an essential prerequisite to the uninterrupted flow of interstate commerce."
In Block v. Hirsh4 ' the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes,
said:
"The general proposition to be maintained is that circumstances
have clothed the letting of buildings in the District of Columbia with
a public interest so great as to justify regulation by law. Plainly
circumstances may so change in time or so differ in space as to clothe
with such an interest what at other times or in other places would be
a matter of purely private concern. It is enough to refer to the decisions as to insurance, in German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233
U. S. 389; irrigation, in Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361; and mining,
in Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527. They
sufficiently illustrate what hardly would be denied. They illustrate also
that the use by the public generally of each specific thing affected cannot
be made the test of public interest, Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton
Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U. S. 30, 32, and
that the public interest may extend to the use of land. They dispel the
notion that what in its immediate aspect may be only a private transac"gbSupra note 49,

at

155, 41

Sup. Ct. at 459.
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tion may not be raised by its class or character to a public affair. See
also Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 1i1, III." . . .
"The main point against the law is that tenants are allowed to remain
in possession at the same rent that they have been paying, unless
modified by the Commission established by the act, and that thus the
use of the land and the right of the owner to do what he will with his
own and to make what contracts he pleases are cut down. But if the
public interest be established the regulation of rates is one of the first
forms in which it is asserted, and the validity of such regulation has
been settled since Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. I13. It is said that a
grain elevator may go out of business whereas here the use is fastened
upon the land. The power to go out of business, when it exists, is an
illusory answer to gas companies and waterworks, but we need not
stop at that. The regulation is put and justified only as a temporary
measure. See Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 345, 346. Fort Smith
& Western R. R. Co. v. Mills, 253 U. S.206. A limit in time, to tide

over a passing trouble, well may justify a law that could not be upheld
as a permanent change."
In the present case it has been contended that the marketing and distribution of agricultural food products is affected with a public interest and
that its regulation is a reasonable and proper exercise of the commerce
power, even though it may restrain the liberty of action and liberty of contract of and take property from certain individuals. Being affected with
such interest, it is contended that price fixing is proper.
In this connection the recent case of New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann5
is most important. In that case by another five to four decision the Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional an Oklahoma statute requiring all persons
in the ice business to obtain a certificate of public necessity (in effect a
license to do business), thereby making the ice business a public utility.
In Adkins v. Children's Hospital,1 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the minimum wage law for women in the District of Columbia. To
the same effect is Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 5 2 holding unconstitutional

a Tennessee statute fixing the price of gasoline.
In Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Relations Court,53 the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional a Kansas statute creating an industrial court
with power to fix prices, wages, and hours of labor.
Nearest to our present case is Fairmont Creamery v. Minnesota, 4
holding unconstitutional a Minnesota statute requiring the buyer of milk
to pay a uniform price therefor. In that case the Supreme Court said:
G285 U.
U261 U.
C2278 U.
6262 U.
274 U.

S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct. 371 (1932).
S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1923).
S. 235, 49 Sup. Ct. II5 (1929).
S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct 630 (1923).
S. 1, 47 Sup. Ct. 5o6 (927).
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"Looking through form to substance, it clearly and unmistakably
infringes private rights whose exercise does not ordinarily produce
evil consequences but the reverse." ,'
To the same effect is Tyson & Bro. v. Banton."> These cases were decided on the theory that the statute violated the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which is the same in phraseology as that of the
Fifth Amendment.
Although the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the states and
the Fifth Amendment only to the federal government, the analogy is clear
and cases under the Fourteenth Amendment should be given great weight
in interpreting the Fifth Amendment.
As against these decisions we have the so-called emergency decisions
quoted above and also the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York
sustaining the recently enacted Emergency Milk Control Law of that state,
under which a milk control board is empowered to fix prices for milk and
its products.5 7 This case is now before the Supreme Court of the United
States for review, a writ of certiorarihaving been granted.
The New York Court of Appeals in deciding that case, speaking
through Chief Justice Pound, said:
"Doubtless the statute before us would be condemned by an earlier
generation as a temerarious interference with the rights of property
and contract . . . But we must not fail to consider . . . that constitutional law is a progressive science; that statutes aiming to establish
a standard of social justice, to conform the law to the accepted standards of the community, to stimulate the production of a vital food
product by fixing living standards of prices for the producer, are to
be interpreted with that degree of liberality which is essential to the
attainment of the end in view . . . and that mere novelty is no
objection to legislation." 58
Delegation of Legislative Authority
It has been further contended that the Agricultural Adjustment Act is
an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the executive branch of the
government. In this regard the most important precedents are the Interstate
Commerce Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Tariff Act of
1922, in which the legislature delegated to the executive branch the right to
carry out the details in applying a general statutory standard to specific
Id. at 9, 47 Sup. Ct. at 508.
U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927).
' People v. Nebbia, 262 N. Y. 259, 186 N. E. 694 (1933). For a discussion of the problem involved in this case, see Manley, Constitutionality of Regulatig Milk as a Public Utility
6273

(1933)

18 CoRN. L. Q. 410.

' People v. Nebbia, supra note 57, at 270, 186 N. E. at 699.
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conditions. This included the right to issue regulations, as does the Agricultural Adjustment Act.
In the case of Hampton & Co. v. United States, in which the Supreme
Court sustained the flexible provisions of the Tariff Act of 1922, the Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Taft, said: "
"The field of Congress involves all and many varieties of legislative action and Congress has found it frequently necessary to use
officers of the Executive Branch, within defined limits, to secure the
exact effect intended by its acts of legislation, by vesting discretion in
such officers to make public regulations interpreting a statute and directing the details of its execution, even to the extent of providing for
penalizing a breach of such regulations."
General
It is also necessary to consider the process tax provided for in the Act.
Although the clauses authorizing a process tax are separate from the title
authorizing marketing agreements, and although the Act contains a separability clause, they are closely interrelated, since the proceeds of the
process tax are used to pay for the administration of marketing agreements.
Some persons have argued that they are so closely related that the unconstitutionality of the tax act feature would void the entire Act.
In a recent article,"1 Kingman Brewster, of the Washington, D. C.,
Bar, reaches the conclusion that the tax is not constitutional largely on the
ground that the devoting of public funds to private enterprises is illegal and
was so held in the Sugar Bounty Cases,62 and in Loan Association v.
Topeka, 3 and on the further ground that there is no public interest involved
and that therefore price fixing is illegal.
0-276

U. S. 394, at 406, 48 Sup. Ct. 348, at 351 (1928).
I A long line of cases has established that it is entirely proper for Congress, having once
expressed its will, to defer to another governmental branch the working out and enforcement
of that will. As Mr. Justice Lamar said in United States v. Grimaud, 22o U. S. 506, 517,
31 Sup. Ct. 480, 483 (911) : "From the beginning of the Government various acts have been
passed conferring upon executive officers powers to make rules and regulations-not for the
government of their departments, but for administering the laws which did govern. None
of these statutes could confer legislative power. But when Congress had legislated and indicated its will, it could give to those who were to act under such general provisions 'power to
fill up the details' by the establishment of administrative rules and regulations, the violation
of which could be punished by fine or imprisonment fixed by Congress, or by penalties fixed
by Congress or measured by the injury done." Mr. Justice Harlan, in Union Bridge Co. v.
United States, 204 U. S. 364, 387, 27 Sup. Ct. 367, 374 (1907) expressed himself in these
words: "Indeed, it is not too much to say that a denial to Congress of the right, under the
Constitution, to delegate the power to determine some fact or the state of things upon which
the enforcement of its enactment depends would be 'to stop the wheels of government' and
bring about confusion, if not paralysis, in the conduct of the public business." See also Field
v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 12 Sup. Ct. 495 (1892) ; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 24
Sup. Ct. 349 (9o4) ; In re Kollock, 165 U. S. 526, 17 Sup. Ct. 444 (1897) ; Oceanic Steam
Interstate Commerce
Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 29 Sup. Ct. 671 (199o).
Commission v. Goodrich Transit Company, 224 U. S. 194, 32 Sup. Ct. 436 (1912).
nBrewster, Is the Process Tax Constitutionalf (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 419.
'United States v. Realty Co.; United States v. Gay, 163 U. S. 427, 16 Sup. Ct. 1120

(896).
62o

Wall. 655 (U. S. 1874).
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It should be noted that even if the Act itself is found to be constitutional, it does not follow that all clauses of marketing agreements entered
into under the law are valid. An executive license issued under the Act
may, by unfairness or discrimination or confiscation or failure to apply the
law properly, be illegal and even unconstitutional.
Conclusion on Constitutionality
In considering the constitutionality of the Act, it has been my effort to
present the most important cases which would have to be considered by the
Supreme Court in the event that it is called upon to pass upon its constitutionality. Those who believe that the Act is constitutional must rely, in
the last analysis, upon one or two cases which were decided under unusual
circumstances. Those who believe the Act is unconstitutional can rely upon
many decisions under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and also upon the Court's views as expressed in Hammer v. Dagenhart,6 4
particularly with reference to states' rights.
From examining these cases, it is apparent that in order to find the
Act constitutional the Supreme Court will have to extend the commerce
clause further than it has ever before been extended, even under unusual
circumstances, and that they will have to do likewise with the taxing power
and with the due process clause. This is particularly true as it is applied to
the fixing of prices to the producer and prices to the consumer, for the
reason that under the views of many earlier cases the former occurs before
commerce has begun, and the latter occurs after commerce has ceased, and
both are "without due process of law" unless the business is affected with
a public interest. Furthermore, when the transaction occurs entirely within
the boundaries of one state, there is no interstate commerce in the physical
sense whatsoever. While it may be possible, technically, for the Court to
extend the rules of Block v. Hirsh and Wilson v. New, 65 to do so will
amount to a social and economic revolution, and, in the view of most
lawyers, to a revolution in constitutional interpretation. In deciding the
question the Court is bound to consider not only the legal principles involved, but also the questions of social philosophy which are presented,6 6 and
on these the issue is squarely joined whether or not the principles of individualism and freedom of action, and above all of states' rights, on which
our country was founded and which were undoubtedly in the minds of the
Constitutional Convention at the time the Constitution was written, are to
be abandoned in favor of a new system of federal control.
" Supra note 22.
"Text, supra pages 107, 1O8.
Sharp, Movement it; Supreme Courb Adjudication (1933)- 46 HARV. L. REv. 361, 795-
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Conclusion
Irrespective of what action may be taken by the Supreme Court, it is
my opinion that these Recovery Acts will leave a very definite impression
on American society. Through their operation during the summer months
we have seen in Washington a resurgence of what occurred during the war
time period. Thousands of persons in various lines of industry have come
together in a sincere effort to cooperate. Through the demand for cooperation has come the growth of the trade association to a point far beyond
anything that it has so far reached in this country. It may be that arbitration of disputes through trade associations will grow up and relieve our
courts of the burdens now carried by them. It may be that the industry
committees constituted by the trade associations will be a sort of "super
power" subject only to the control of the government through a veto or
through other means. Even though the Acts were declared unconstitutional tomorrow, it is my opinion that industry, through this development,
has grown to know its problems in the larger sense better than at any
time heretofore, and that that will be a lasting benefit. Nevertheless, if
this method of society continues, it is bound to result in curtailment of
personal liberties, in a much greater difficulty for the newcomer to enter
into business, and a distinct lull in initiative, enterprise, and new invention.
Reliance on self may well be replaced by reliance on government, and other
results equally revolutionary may well occur.
I emphasize these things because, in the last analysis, if the people
desire a continuance of the N. I. R. A. and the A. A. A. and kindred legislation, they have it in their power to amend our Constitution, and the fact
that the Supreme Court may or may not declare the present measures unconstitutional will in the long run possibly not be of much effect. It is
these questions of social philosophy which in the last analysis will always
govern our laws, and it is well for the student of current legislation to consider that the law merely reflects the conditions under which it was enacted,
and that as those conditions change, an entirely different conception of the
law and its functions may arise, and entirely new laws may be enacted
which will have received the sanction of the people and will be binding on all.

